How wages change: Micro evidence from the international wage flexibility project by Dickens, William T. et al.
How Wages Change: Micro Evidence
from the International Wage Flexibility
Project
William T. Dickens, Lorenz Goette, Erica L.
Groshen, Steinar Holden, Julian Messina, Mark E.
Schweitzer, Jarkko Turunen, and Melanie E. Ward
Workers’ wages are not set in a spot market. Instead, the wages of mostworkers—at least those who do not switch jobs—typically change onlyannually and are mediated by a complex set of institutions and factors
such as contracts, unions, standards of fairness, minimum wage policy, transfers of
risk, and incomplete information. The goal of the International Wage Flexibility
Project (IWFP)—a consortium of over 40 researchers with access to individual
workers’ earnings data for 16 countries—is to provide new microeconomic evi-
dence on how wages change for continuing workers. Wage changes due to worker
mobility are governed by different processes and are beyond the scope of this study.
A key question in the theoretical and empirical literature, as reviewed in
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Camba-Mendez, Garcı´a, and Rodrı´quez Palenzuela (2003) and Holden (2004), is
the extent to which job stayers resist wage cuts—that is, the extent to which
downward wage rigidity exists. These studies have yielded remarkably inconsistent
findings, both across different countries and across different datasets for the same
country. For example, in U.S. data, studies using company wage records typically
show almost no wage cuts, while several papers analyzing individual data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) find what appear to be many nominal
wage cuts. (Those studies take no account of measurement error—for discussion,
see Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry, 1996; Altonji and Devereux, 2000.) However,
studies of individual earnings data from Great Britain show less evidence of down-
ward nominal wage rigidity than what is discerned from analysis of U.S. data
(Nickell and Quintini, 2003; Smith, 2000). Moreover, almost all of the existing
studies concentrate on nominal wage rigidity, even though workers may resist real
wage cuts as well as nominal wage cuts.
The International Wage Flexibility Project sought to reconcile these divergent
results. The goals of the project were to gather international data on wages that
make it possible to describe the extent of wage flexibility, with a particular focus on
the extent of downward wage rigidity, and then to determine how measures of wage
flexibility are affected by the wage-setting regimes that typically vary by country and
by the different types of data on wages. This paper reports on our analyses of
individuals’ earnings changes in 31 different datasets from which we obtain a total
of 360 wage change distributions—one for each year in each dataset. These data
were analyzed by 13 research teams from participating countries and a coordinat-
ing team based at the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve Banks of New
York and Cleveland, the Brookings Institution, and the Universities of Oslo and
Zurich.
Like previous studies, we find a remarkable amount of variation in percentage
wage changes across individuals in nearly every country in every year. We estimate
that the standard deviation of annual wage changes within countries averages at
least 7.7 percentage points, although this measure contains some uncertainty due
to the extent of measurement error. Wage changes in nearly every country in every
year have a notably nonnormal distribution. Workers’ wage changes are both much
more clustered around the median and have many more extreme values than the
normal distribution. Moreover, nearly all countries show asymmetry in their wage
change distributions. One common asymmetry is a high incidence of wage freezes
and a lack of nominal wage cuts, which we take as evidence of downward rigidity in
nominal wages. A second asymmetry is a tendency for workers’ wage changes to
clump in the vicinity of the expected rate of price inflation, which we take as
evidence of downward real wage rigidity. We find evidence of substantial variation
across countries in the extent of both downward nominal and downward real wage
rigidity, even after we control for dataset characteristics. When we examine how our
measures of rigidity relate to a number of characteristics of labor markets in the
countries of our sample, only greater union density appears to have a robust
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relationship with downward real wage rigidity—that is, countries with greater union
density have a greater incidence of downward real wage rigidity.
International Data on Wage Changes
The 31 datasets analyzed for the International Wage Flexibility Project cover
over 31 million wage changes and are diverse with respect to source, coverage,
years, and definitions of variables of interest. An important advantage of studying
many different datasets is that we can consider how various dataset characteristics
can cause observed differences in wage rigidity across countries.
Table 1 describes the data sources. The three main sources of data are
employment registers, household surveys, and employer surveys. An employment
register, which is maintained by a government for the administration of taxes
and/or benefits, covers all workers in a specified universe and has minimal report-
ing error. Some country teams worked with random samples drawn from the
registers, while others analyzed the entire census. Household surveys sample from
the universe of all workers, but typically rely on respondent recall and so are subject
to both sampling and reporting error. Employer wage and salary surveys typically
cover all workers in the occupations and firms in their purview and draw their data
from payroll records, but vary considerably in how many occupations or firms they
cover. The employer surveys in the International Wage Flexibility Project are
particularly comprehensive because they are conducted by national employer
associations and are used extensively for policy and managerial purposes.
The time periods covered by the different datasets vary, with some starting in
the early 1970s and some running through the beginnings of the 2000s, with an
average of twelve years per dataset. The total 360 dataset years observed include
multiple datasets for twelve countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Datasets also vary in terms of the compensation measure available. In each
dataset, we attempt to measure the wage component of compensation only. Ideally
we would analyze the agreed-upon hourly, weekly, monthly, or annual compensa-
tion rate for workers in each of our samples. This measure would include not just
monetary compensation, but also the value to the worker of all nonpecuniary
compensation as well. We do not view total compensation cost to employers as a
good proxy for this concept, because it can be affected by price adjustments in
components such as workers’ compensation insurance or employment taxes, with-
out a change in the effective compensation that the worker sees. Focusing on the
wage component avoids this problem of shifting costs and has the additional
benefit of being the most consistent concept across countries. Focusing on wages
does have the drawback of omitting consideration of other aspects of compensation
that may be deliberately adjusted by employers to increase flexibility. However,
some evidence suggests that these other adjustments may not have much effect on
downward wage rigidity: for example, Lebow, Saks, and Wilson (2003) find no
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evidence that U.S. employers change other types of remuneration so as to circum-
vent the binding downward rigidity of base wages. Finally, we exclude large outliers
in wage changes because they likely reflect wage reporting errors or unidentified
Table 1
International Wage Flexibility Project Dataset Characteristics
Totals Averages
Countries 16
Datasets 31 Datasets per country 1.6
Dataset years 360 Years per dataset 11.6
Wage changes observed 31.3 million Observations per dataset year 87,000
Country Dataset* Years Wage Measure
1. Austria Social Security 1972–1998 Annual earnings
2. Belgium Social Security 1978–1985 Annual earnings
3. Denmark Statistics Denmark register of
employees
1981–1999 Annual earnings
4. Finland Service employers 1990–2001 Wages/hour
Industry employers (manual) 1985–2000 Wages/hour
Industry employers (nonmanual) 1985–2000 Wages/hour
5. France La De´claration Automatise´ des
Salaires (DADS)
1976–1980,
1984–1989,
1991–2000
Annual earnings/hour
Labor Survey (households) 1994–2000 Earnings/hour
6. Germany Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt und
Berufsforschung (IAB)
1975–1996 Earnings**
7. Italy Social Insurance 1985–1996 Annual earnings
8. Norway Business and industry employers
(blue collar)
1987–1998 Wages/hour
Business and industry employers
(white collar)
1981–1997 Wages/hour
9. Portugal Quadros de Pessoal 1991–2000 Wages/hour
10. Sweden Employers (blue collar) 1979–1990,
1995–2003
Wages/hour
Employers (white collar) 1995–2003 Wages/hour
11. Switzerland Social Insurance 1988–1999 Annual earnings
Labor Force Survey (households) 1992–1999 Wages
12. U.K. National Employment Survey 1976–2000 Earnings/hour
13. U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(household survey)
1970–1997 Wages/hour
14. Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, U.K.
European Community
Household Panel (household
survey)
1993–2001*** Earnings/hour
* Datasets come from employer surveys, labor force surveys, and administrative sources. Datasets not
labeled “employers” or “surveys” are from administrative sources.
** German wage data refer to earnings for most of the time period, but to wages before 1984.
*** Available years vary somewhat by country.
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job changes, rather than the actual experience of ongoing workers. Increases of
more than 60 percent in wage data or 100 percent in annual income data and
cuts of more than 35 percent in wage data or 85 percent in income data were
eliminated.
Eleven of our 31 datasets have either information on workers’ hourly wages, or
measures of their base earnings over fixed periods of time that are equivalent to
hourly wage data for our purposes. In the other cases, we have monthly or annual
income data that must be converted to hourly wages using hours data (usually the
normal hours of work). Since hours measures are often imprecise for a number of
reasons, this procedure introduces error into our wage measure akin to those in
survey data. We construct our measure of annual percentage wage changes by
taking the difference between consecutive years’ log reported or computed wages.
As noted earlier, we restrict our analysis to job stayers so that we can
concentrate on the wage rigidity in ongoing employment relationships. In our
data, restricting attention to job stayers typically reduces our samples by about
17 percent.
How Wage Changes Are Distributed
To illustrate some key features of wage change distributions, Figure 1 shows
the actual distribution of changes in log wages (represented as percentage changes
in levels) received by wage earners who were heads of households in the United
States in 1987, by white-collar workers in Finland in 1988, by all workers in the
United Kingdom in 1984, and by all workers in Ireland in 1996. The histograms are
constructed using intervals that are 1 percentage point wide, so that the height of
the rectangles shows the fraction of people with wage changes in that range. In
addition, the fraction of workers with no change in their pay is shown with the dark
bar at zero.1
A number of key features typical of wage change distributions are illustrated in
these four panels. First, all four examples show considerable variation across
workers in the magnitude of wage changes within a year. The average standard
deviation of measured percentage wage changes across all our datasets is 9 per-
centage points. Second, median wage changes typically (in 80 percent of dataset-
year observations) exceed contemporary or lagged inflation rates (shown in black
lines). This pattern is expected when productivity is growing and labor market slack
is not excessive.
Third, wage changes are not normally distributed. Given the median and
variance actually observed, people’s wage changes are much more clustered and
1 The cells on either side of zero are slightly less than 1 percentage point wide as the cell at zero includes
observations within 0.017 percentage points of zero (0.1 percentage points in countries where wages are
constructed from annual income) and those observations are not included in the cells on either side.
We did this because problems in the accuracy with which earnings and hours data were recorded in
some datasets created tiny phantom wage changes.
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Figure 1
Wage Change Histograms
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peaked around the median change than in a normal distribution. Also, the wage
change distributions have many more extremely high raises than would occur in a
normal distribution. (This is not apparent on Figure 1 as the far tails are not
graphed.) A lesser-known statistical distribution called a Weibull distribution does
fit to the upper tail of each wage distribution (that is, the area above the median)
much better than does the normal distribution. When a variable has a Weibull
distribution, the density declines exponentially in the log of the distance from the
mode.
For wage changes below the median value (the lower tail), only for Ireland
does the Weibull distribution fit the data particularly well. The Irish wage changes
do not display two features found in other distributions. The Irish workers have a
lower incidence of wage freezes (the spike at zero) than do the U.S. and U.K.
workers; indeed, Irish workers reported almost as many nominal wage cuts as would
be expected with a symmetric distribution. In addition, the Irish workers’ wage
changes were not as strongly clustered near the inflation rate (either current or last
year’s rate), as were the U.K. and Finnish workers’ wage adjustments. One main
reason why the Irish distribution of wages has higher variance and is less smooth
than the other distributions is because of the data source. The Irish data reported
here are from the European Community Household Panel, a dataset with fewer
observations and more reporting error than most of our other datasets.
Figure 2 shows broader evidence based on all our wage data, of two key
asymmetries: one is nominal wage freezes, while the other is the clustering of wages
around the level that would represent a real wage freeze. For these figures, we
include all dataset years with the exception of those datasets reporting annual
income data, because the categories used to classify observations are not the same
as those used in the analysis of the other datasets. This leaves us with 273 dataset years.
Figure 2a shows the asymmetry caused by downward nominal wage rigidity. In
this figure, we average the frequency of workers in each wage change cell across
datasets. On average, about 8 percent of workers receive nominal wage freezes in
the wage samples. This may not seem like much, but recall that in many years, many
of the countries covered were experiencing considerable inflation. Figure 2a also
shows that the distribution of wages is not symmetric; besides the spike at zero there
are fewer observations below zero than symmetry with the upper half of the
distribution would lead one to expect.
Figure 2a does not indicate the extent of downward real wage rigidity, since
rates of actual and expected inflation vary across countries and years. To do this, we
can instead center the wage change distribution for each country and year on the
interval that contains its median wage change, as shown in Figure 2b. We also drop
the nominal wage freezes seen in Figure 2a. Hence, the height of each bar shows
the average share of workers receiving a wage change of the specified amount above
or below the median change in that year (providing the worker did not have a
nominal wage freeze). We expect that, averaged over the business cycle, wage
growth equals price inflation plus productivity growth. Sixty-one percent of con-
temporaneous inflation rates fall in the histogram cell containing the median or
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the in two cells just below it, and 51 percent of the previous years’ inflation rates fall
in that range. Thus the raises of workers with expected real wage freezes will be
clustered a percentage point or two below the median wage change.
To make it easy to see what symmetry would imply for the distribution in
Figure 2b, we have superimposed the outline of the upper half of the distribution
on the lower half of the distribution. The incidence of wage changes in the lower
Figure 2b: Wage Change Centered on Median
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Note: To make it easy to see what symmetry would imply for the distribution, in Figure 2b we have
superimposed the outline of the upper half of the distribution on the lower half of the distribution.
Figure 2
Wage Change Distribution for All Countries and Years
Figure 2a: Nominal Wage Change
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tail is substantially lower than in the symmetric distribution, with the exception of
the two cells just below the median, where the incidence of wage changes is higher
than the symmetric distribution. This suggests that many wage change observations
have been affected by downward real wage rigidity, which has pushed these low
wage changes up from the left of the lower tail towards the bins closer to the
median. Thus, across these national samples, many more workers experience wage
increases close to the expected rate of inflation than symmetry would imply, and
many fewer receive wages changes below that level.
Recall that not all countries show signs of downward real rigidity; thus, this
divergence from symmetry is all the more notable because it is driven only by a
subset of countries. Furthermore, if we add the wage freezes back in, distributing
them proportionally over the lower tail with the missing observations, the asym-
metry is still notable.
Clearly, the dispersion of wage changes is different above and below the
median. We calculated a measure of standard deviation separately for the portion
of the distribution above the median and for the portion below the median for all
the IWFP datasets.2 This measure for the lower is smaller than the measure for the
upper tail both on average—7.4 percent versus 13 percent—and in almost every
case (356 out of 360 IWFP dataset years).3 The difference in dispersion between the
upper and lower tail is driven mainly by the two sources of asymmetry we just
described. A closer examination reveals that the difference between the dispersion
of the upper and lower tail declines as wage inflation increases. This pattern seems
to be due to the lower incidence of wage freezes as the median wage change moves
further away from zero.
Finally, we can learn about errors in wage data from the auto-covariance of
individual wage changes. We are computing wage changes from wage levels re-
ported a year apart. Thus, the presence of errors in the reporting, recording, or
calculating of the wage level in any year—assuming that errors are not correlated
from one year to the next—would cause large positive wage changes to be followed
by small or negative wage changes in the next year, while small positive changes, or
any size negative changes, would be followed by large positive changes. All else
equal, the more errors present in a particular dataset, the more negative will be the
auto-covariance of wage changes. We have computed the auto-covariance of wage
changes for every year and dataset in our study excluding the datasets where the
wage measure is based on annual income.4 Nearly all (91 percent) of the dataset-
year auto-covariances are negative, with an average value of –0.002. Negative
auto-covariance could also be a feature of the true wage change distribution.
2 Specifically, we calculated the square root of the mean squared deviation of observations from the
median and carried out this calculation separately for the upper and the lower tail.
3 The exceptions are France in 1980 and 1994, Italy in 1991, and Switzerland in 1999.
4 If the dates over which income are measured are not synchronized with wage changes, the income
measure will confound two wage levels. This induces a positive correlation in wage changes on top of the
negative correlation caused by errors and makes the income data inappropriate for this exercise.
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However, in the few datasets where base wages are reported in administrative data,
cases where we would expect the fewest errors, the auto-covariance is essentially
zero. The fact the auto-covariance is absent in data with no errors strongly suggests
that measurement error is the source of virtually all auto-covariance that we do
observe in our wage-change data. If the only source of auto-covariance in our data
is measurement error, and the measurement errors are uncorrelated from one
period to the next, then the average standard deviation of measurement error in
the data is about 4 percentage points. This would imply that the average standard
deviation of true wage changes is about 7.7 percentage points across our datasets.5
What Statistical Distributions Imply about Wage Setting
The features of the wage change distributions highlighted above—their ten-
dency to follow a Weibull distribution above the median, with higher peaks at the
median value and more frequent high positive values compared to the normal
distribution, along with the evidence of nominal and real asymmetries—may reveal
quite a bit about the wage-setting process. The central limit theorem states that a
variable will tend to be normally distributed when a large number of independent
influences affect it in an additive manner. In more practical terms, suppose each
worker’s performance was scored separately for a number of independent tasks or
competencies that comprised a job. Then, suppose that the wage increases for the
workers are based on additive rewards for the number of independent successes a
worker has, compared to average performance. In such a setting, wage changes
should be approximately normally distributed. However, the evidence shows that
wages are not normally distributed, but instead have more observations at their
peak and in their tails than a normal distribution.
A Weibull distribution will provide a good approximation to the distribution if,
instead, workers’ raises are based on sequential standards, where only those who
meet all prior standards are considered for the next level, and at each level, rewards
increase exponentially. For example, assume that workers’ abilities are tested in a
prescribed sequence and at each stage the surviving workers either fail and drop
out of further contention or “make the grade” and go on to compete in the next
round.6
People of only average performance receive the median wage changes. Those
who achieve one level of distinction (but no more) receive a small bonus of size b
above the median wage change. From among those who succeed the first time,
5 Under the assumptions just specified, the auto-covariance will equal minus the variance of the
measurement error. Thus, adding it to the variance of wages in our datasets yields an estimate of the true
variance of wage changes, and taking the square root of that yields the true standard deviation of wage
changes. We average this value across all countries (except those where wages are based on annual
earnings, which have a more complicated covariance structure) and years to get 7.7 percentage points.
6 While this section uses individual performance to describe a process that generates a Weibull distri-
bution, this process could also work among “surviving” teams, establishments, or firms.
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some will achieve just one more level of distinction and receive an increase of b2a
(a  1). Others will manage to distinguish themselves even further (a third time)
and receive a bonus of size b3a. If a constant fraction of workers fails to reach each
successive level of distinction, then the distribution of wage increases will be
approximated by a Weibull distribution.7
The relatively good fit of the Weibull distribution to the upper tail suggests that
a survivor process like this may be at work determining wage increases. The process
just described is similar in some ways to Rosen’s (1986) tournament model; though
that model was meant to describe the distribution of wages and changes over a
career rather than a single year. It also doesn’t explain the pattern in the lower tail
of the distribution, which is more varied. If there are few wage freezes, in either real
or nominal terms—as we see in the case of Ireland in 1996 in Figure 1—it appears
that wage changes lower than the median are determined by a similar process to
wage increases. That is, cascades of shortcomings lead to deviations from the
average that increase at an exponential rate with more failures.
However, labor markets in many countries do display a degree of downward
wage rigidity. The presence of downward nominal wage rigidity can explain the
presence of large numbers of wage freezes—that is, the spike at zero—and the
relative lack of wage cuts. Downward real wage rigidity can account for the tendency
for a larger number of workers to receive wage changes closer to the expected rate
of inflation than might be expected if symmetry were preserved. That would also
explain the paucity of observations below this range in the lower tail. Finally, the
presence of both downward nominal and real wage rigidity would explain the
tendency for the variance of the lower tail to be less than the variance of the upper
tail, while the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity would explain why the
difference declines as the rate of wage inflation rises.
Measuring Rigidity
We can use the observed deviations from symmetry in the wage change distri-
butions to construct, for each distribution, measures of the extent of downward
7 In this example, the Weibull cumulative distribution function would take the form
W  x  1  epXb1/a
where p is the fraction of workers at each level of distinction who fail in rising to each higher level of
distinction. The Weibull cumulative distribution function that we use to describe the distribution of
wage changes above the median can be viewed as an exponential distribution where the argument of the
distribution has been scaled by taking it to a power between 0 and 1. Exponential distributions provide
a much better fit to wage changes above the median in our wage change distributions than do
normal distributions. However, the Weibull allows an even better fit. Actual wage changes are both
more clustered and have more extremely large raises and wage cuts than predicted by exponential
distributions.
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nominal and downward real wage rigidity. In conceptual terms, we are seeking
measures that are largely independent of the dataset-year economic conditions in
the various countries. Thus, we do not want a measure such as the fraction of
workers with nominal wage freezes in a year, because this fraction varies with the
expected rate of inflation and so could prove a misleading basis for thinking about
the extent of wage rigidity. Instead, we construct measures that represent the
fraction of workers “covered by” each type of wage rigidity. In most cases this
“coverage” is informal, not contractual. An alternative term would be “susceptible
to” rigidity. However, wage rigidities are likely to reflect worker resistance to wage
cuts, and we think of workers whose wages are rigid as being “covered” by some
implicit or explicit agreement or norm that limits their employers’ ability to cut
their wages.
We call our measures of downward nominal and downward real wage rigidity
n and r, respectively. Each is conceived of as the fraction of workers who, if they are
in the position of being scheduled for either a nominal or real wage cut, whether
because of individual performance or external conditions, would receive a nominal
or real wage freeze instead.
For downward nominal wage rigidity, our measure is straightforward. We
assume that everyone who had a nominal wage freeze would have had a nominal
wage cut in the absence of downward nominal rigidity and construct
n  fn/fn cn,
where fn is the fraction of workers with nominal wage freezes and cn is the fraction
with nominal wage cuts.8
Our estimate of downward real wage rigidity is conceptually similar, but for
several reasons more complicated in practice. First, because inflation expectations
can differ between firms and individuals, there is no sharp spike in the distribution
where we can confidently say that everyone at that spike experiences a real wage
freeze. Thus, our measure of downward real wage rigidity is based on the fraction
of observations missing from the lower tail below our estimate of the expected rate
of inflation, as compared to the equivalent area of the upper tail of the
distribution.9 The underlying idea is that in the absence of downward real wage
rigidity, there would be as many people in the lower tail as in the corresponding
region of the upper tail, but that downward real wage rigidity causes some of
those who would be in the lower tail to be piled up around the expected rate of
inflation.
8 Although we allow for wage changes slightly more or less than zero to be in the zero bin to compensate
for some numerical accuracy problems in the data we are using, we are confident that the zero wage
changes are overwhelmingly exact wage freezes.
9 In one-fifth of our country–year observations, our estimate of the expected rate of inflation is greater
than the median wage increase, implying that “the lower tail” covers more than 50 percent of the
observations. For these country–years, this measure of downward rigidity cannot be constructed.
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If everyone had exactly the same expected rate of inflation, and the distribu-
tion of wage changes in the absence of wage rigidity was symmetric, then the
fraction of workers in the upper tail minus the fraction in the lower tail below the
expected rate of inflation would equal the fraction of workers with real wage
freezes. But even if our estimate of the expected rate of inflation coincides with the
median of the expected rate of inflation for our observations, half of all wage
changes will in fact be based on inflation expectations that are lower than our
estimate. If these wage setters receive a wage change equal to their own expected
rate of inflation, their wage change will be below our expected rate of inflation.
Thus, even if downward real wage rigidity binds for these observations, they will still
not be missing in the lower tail to the left of our estimated expected rate of
inflation. Since half those with freezes will be missing from the lower tail, we
multiply the missing observations in the lower tail by two.
To calculate the fraction of workers covered by downward real wage rigidity, we
must divide the number of workers with real wage freezes by the number potentially
affected, which is all workers who would have received a wage change below our
estimate of the expected rate of inflation in the absence of downward real rigidity
which we estimate as equal to the fraction of workers in the upper tail. Formally, we
obtain
r  fr/ fr cr  2u  l/u,
where u is the fraction of observations in the upper tail above m  (m – e); m is the
median and e is the expected rate of inflation; l is the fraction of observations in
the lower tail below e; fr  2(u – l) is the fraction of workers for whom downward
wage rigidity binds; and fr  cr  u is thus our measure of real freezes plus real cuts.
We construct e as the predicted rate of inflation from a country-specific regression
of annual rates of inflation on lagged inflation.
A large value for real rigidity r may reflect phenomena other than downward
real wage rigidity, because a concentration of wage changes at values other than the
expected rate of inflation could affect it. For example, if government, business, and
labor agree on a minimum wage increase meant to apply to all workers, our
measure could show this as real rigidity even if the minimum wage increase allowed
real growth or decline. In the interests of expositional brevity, we call r “downward
real rigidity,” even though we recognize that the focal change could deviate from
price inflation expectations.
It is worth noting that the concepts we attempt to measure here are quite
different from the common conception of nominal and real wage rigidity as slow
adjustment to nominal and real shocks. While downward nominal and downward
real rigidity might be causes of slow adjustment, there could be other sources of
slow adjustment. Moreover, remember that these measures of nominal and real
rigidity do not show the actual percentage of workers experiencing nominal and
real rigidity; rather they attempt to capture what share of workers relative to the
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group that might otherwise have experienced declining nominal or real wages,
experiences wage rigidity instead.
As illustrations, we report these measures for the four distributions shown in
Figure 1. The U.S. economy in 1987 shows high nominal rigidity, with n  54
percent, but no apparent real rigidity, with r  3 percent.10 Finland’s white-
collar employees in 1988 show low nominal rigidity at n  18 percent, but high
real rigidity at r  99 percent. The United Kingdom in 1984 shows fairly high
nominal and real rigidity, with n  28 percent and r  30 percent. Ireland in 1996
shows little of either rigidity, with nominal rigidity, n,  3 percent and real rigidity,
r,  1 percent.
Variation in our Rigidity Measures
We now wish to explore whether wage rigidity differs across countries. We find
considerable variation in the extent of both real and nominal rigidity across
countries when we average across all datasets and time, as shown in Figure 3.
Averaging across years and datasets within countries, estimates of the fraction of
workers covered by downward nominal wage rigidity, n, averages 28 percent and
ranges from 4 percent in Ireland to 58 percent in Portugal, while the comparable
average for real rigidity, r, is 26 percent, with a range from 1 percent in the
Netherlands to 68 percent in Sweden. The standard deviations of n and r across all
our dataset-year observations are 13 and 22 percentage points, respectively. The
differences across countries are statistically significant at any conventional level of
significance.11
We compared our measures to those from two other cross-country studies
that use different methodologies to estimate the average extent of downward
nominal wage rigidity. Our country average estimates of downward nominal
rigidity have correlation coefficients of 0.46 with 15 country estimates from
Holden and Wulfsberg (2006, appendix table) and 0.45 with 11 country estimates
from Knoppik and Beissinger (2005). We would not expect a perfect correlation
because the estimates cover different time periods and diverge in data and tech-
nique. Thus, we consider the correspondence between these studies to be reason-
ably strong.
Do these differences in wage rigidity across countries reflect real differences in
labor markets across the countries or do they reflect only differences in the way
10 Even though we think of r as the fraction of workers covered by downward real rigidity, our measure
takes a negative value if the fraction of observations in the lower tail below the expected rate of inflation
is greater than the fraction in the upper tail to which it is compared.
11 Specifically, we regress these country–year measures on a set of country indicator variables and test
their joint significance. For both downward nominal rigidity (r) and downward real wage rigidity (n), we
easily reject the hypothesis that the extent of measured rigidity is constant across countries at any
conventional level of significance. For downward real rigidity (r), F  7.63; df(15, 257). For downward
nominal wage rigidity (n), F10.01; df(15, 344).
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wages are reported, recorded, and computed in the different datasets? To find out,
we run regressions with our measure of nominal rigidity n and real rigidity r as the
dependent variables. For the explanatory variables, we first use indicator variables
for a number of different dataset characteristics: whether we have hours informa-
tion, whether the wage measure is based on total earnings or base wages, whether
the wage measure is based on annual income, whether the data were collected with
a labor market survey, and whether the data came from the European Community
Household Panel. We also add our index of measurement error—the auto-covari-
ance of wage changes—as an explanatory variable. Several of the dataset charac-
teristics are statistically significant. In particular, there are positive and statistically
significant coefficients on the auto-covariance of wage changes in both regressions,
suggesting that measurement error biases both of our rigidity measures downward.
However, even after adjusting for dataset characteristics, country differences in
both downward nominal and downward real rigidity remain statistically significant
at the 0.001 level.12
12 For downward real rigidity (r), F  2.24 and (df  15, 251). For downward nominal wage rigidity (n),
F  7.96 and (df  15, 338). We tested the validity and robustness of these country estimates in a
number of ways laid out in full detail in Dickens et al. (2006). The two main changes were to incorporate
corrections for measurement error and to estimate the size of rigidities by comparing true wage changes
Figure 3
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Note: The table shows the fraction of worker in each country potentially affected by downward real
and nominal wage rigidity.
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Since the cross-country differences in wage rigidity do not seem readily ex-
plainable by the characteristics of the data, we next examined the correlation of our
rigidity measures with a number of measures of labor market institutions and other
characteristics of the economy which might influence the functioning of the labor
market. The variables we examined included two measures of strike activity; union
density; union coverage; two indexes of the level at which bargaining takes place;
two indexes of the degree of coordination in bargaining; a corporatism index
combining level and coordination in bargaining; the fraction of part-time workers
in the labor force; the fraction of temporary workers in the labor force; two
measures of income distribution; six measures of the average tax wedge in com-
pensation; four indices of employment protection legislation; two measures of the
average replacement rates for unemployment benefits; duration of unemployment
benefits; an indicator variable for the presence of any sort of institutional wage
indexation; indices of the extent of active and passive labor market policies; two
measures of the impact of minimum wages; a measure of the openness of the
economy; and two indices of the extent of product market regulation.13
For each measure we correlated country averages for the variable with country
averages for our rigidity measures and we also regressed our country–year estimates
of our rigidity measures on the individual labor market variables and our dataset
characteristic variables. Figure 4 shows scatterplots of the relationship between n
and r, and three of the many variables we examined—namely employment protec-
tion legislation, corporatism, and union density.
Of all the characteristics we examine, only the relationship between real
rigidity and union density is statistically significant at the 0.05 level in both the
country- and dataset-year-level regressions. There we find that increasing union
density is associated with increasing real rigidity. It is plausible that collective
bargaining would give more attention to real, as opposed to nominal, compensa-
tion because the participants may be more likely to understand the difference, hold
expectations for the future inflation, and be more likely to be familiar with inflation
with the hypothetical wage change distribution that would prevail in the absence of rigidities. The
differences across countries remain statistically significant.
13 We drew upon six sources for these institutional variables: 1) Checchi and Lucifora (2002) provide an
index of wage indexation (extended by the authors); measures of earnings inequality; measure of
openness to international trade; index of overall product market regulation; and ratio of minimum to
average wage. 2) Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta (1998), including updates, where available, from
OECD (2004, 2005), provide data on percentage of trade union coverage; percentage of trade union
membership; wage bargaining centralization index; wage bargaining coordination index; average and
marginal tax wedge measures; index of employment protection legislation on aggregate, regular, and
temporary contracts; gross benefit replacement rate; ratio of minimum to median wage; index of overall
product market regulation; and expenditure on active and passive labor market policies. 3) Eurostat’s
Labour Force Survey, available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu	, provided data on percentage of
part-time employment and percentage of temporary employment. 4) Golden, Lange, and Wallerstein (1999)
provided data on bargaining level. 5) International Labour Organisation, at http://www.ilo.org	, pro-
vided data on measures of strike activity. 6) Nickell and Nuziata (2000) provide an index of bargaining
coordination; average tax wedge; index of employment protection legislation; average replacement rate; and
duration of unemployment benefits.
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forecasts. Furthermore, unions might also have the bargaining power to ensure
compensation for inflation in situations where nonunionized workers might have
to accept constant nominal wages.
But even the connection between unions and wage rigidity, although it may
seem obvious in theory, appears somewhat shakier in our data than one might
expect. For example, if union density is a significant predictor of real wage rigidity,
one might expect that bargaining coverage would also be positively related with real
rigidity, but the correlation is only significant at the .10 level in a one-tailed-test in
both specifications.
Figure 4
Correlations of Institutional Variables with Rigidity Measures
(Pearson’s r is the correlation; significance levels in parentheses)
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When it comes to the effect of union density and coverage on nominal rigidity,
the simple correlations of country averages are both negative, but neither is
statistically significant. However, when we use annual observations, control for
dataset characteristics, and use Huber–White standard errors clustered on country,
the correlations become statistically significantly negative. We conjecture that by
causing workers to focus on real rather than nominal values unions may reduce the
importance of downward nominal wage rigidity.
We examined our estimates of downward real and downward nominal rigidity
for evidence of time trends, and find no consistent evidence of changes over time
for all countries combined. However, there are a few country-specific trends.
Notably, there is some evidence that downward real rigidity in the United States in
the 1970s virtually disappears in the 1980s, coincident with the decline in pattern
bargaining by U.S. unions (Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992).
We also examined the relationship of wage rigidity to inflation. As explained
earlier, our measures of the extent of nominal and real wage rigidity were con-
structed with the intention that they should not be much affected by inflation, and
they are not. Our measures describe the likelihood that a worker facing the
probability of stagnant or declining nominal wages receives a wage freeze. The
fraction of workers actually affected by downward nominal wage rigidity is another
matter; this fraction should rise as inflation falls, since the number of workers to
whom firms would like to give pay cuts is larger when inflation is low. Indeed, we
find that the fraction of workers with nominal wage freezes in any year declines by
more than 1.4 percentage points for each percentage point increase in the median
wage change. The coefficient hardly changes when we add controls for dataset
characteristics and country indicator variables, and it gets larger when we add
indicator variables for year.
Conclusion
With data from 15 European countries and the United States, we find that
wage change distributions have a number of characteristics in common and some
important differences. In all countries at nearly all times, the distribution of wage
changes is notably nonnormal. The Weibull distribution provides a much better fit
to the upper tail above the median. The lower tail of the wage distribution varies
from country to country. Some countries show little downward rigidity in nominal
or real wages, and in those cases the lower tail of the wage distribution takes on the
Weibull form. Other countries show downward rigidity of nominal wages, but not
real wages; downward rigidity of real wages, but not nominal wages; or even a fair
degree of downward rigidity in both real and nominal wages.
We find substantial differences across the countries in our study in the extent
of both nominal and real downward wage rigidity. Across countries, we estimate
that an average of 28 percent of workers are covered by downward nominal rigidity,
in the sense that 28 percent of the wage cuts that would have taken place under
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flexible wage setting are prevented by downward rigidity. Correspondingly, an
average of 26 percent of workers are covered by downward real rigidity, in the sense
that 26 percent of the real wage cuts that would have taken place under more
flexible wage setting are prevented by downward rigidity. Measurement error
appears to bias both measures downward, so the incidence of both nominal and
real rigidities is probably higher. Nevertheless, these similar averages mask consid-
erable variety: country averages for downward real wage rigidity range from 1 per-
cent in the Netherlands to 68 percent in Sweden with a standard deviation across
countries of 22 percentage points. For downward nominal wage rigidity, country
averages for the fraction of workers covered range from 4 percent in Ireland to 58
percent in Portugal, with a standard deviation of 13 percentage points. Although
differences in the nature of our data across countries certainly explain some of the
cross-country variation of our rigidity measures, large differences remain even after
we control for dataset characteristics.
Wage-setting behavior and wage rigidity have important implications for firm
behavior, unemployment, macroeconomic stability, and other areas of economics;
yet many questions remain to be answered about why these patterns occur. We have
offered some hypotheses about the sort of wage-setting mechanisms that could
underlie a Weibull distribution, but these explanations deserve further consider-
ation and exploration. Although we examined many labor market and related
economic variables that might plausibly help explain differences across countries in
the extent of wage rigidity, the only solid connection we find is that union density
has a robust positive association with downward real rigidity.
y This paper reports the results of the International Wage Flexibility Project. The Interna-
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Nathalie Fourcade, Seppo Laaksonen, Michael Lettau, Pedro Portugal, Jimmy Royer, Mickael
Backman, Kjell Salvanes, Paolo Sestito, Alfred Stiglbauer, Uwe Sunde, Jari Vainiomaki,
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